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AFTERWORD: A THOUGHT ABOUT
FEMINIST LITIGATION STRATEGIES
VALORIE VOJDIK*

As a feminist litigator, I continue to struggle with the decision of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
("MCAD") in Stropnicky v. Nathanson, which held that Judith Nathanson's decision to represent only women in divorce proceedings
constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.' The contributors persuasively advance a number of reasons why Nathanson should be
permitted to represent only women, at least under certain circumstances: that her action is a benign compensatory measure to remedy the effects of past discrimination; that her choice is an
associational right protected by the First Amendment; 2 that she has
the right to be protected from compelled speech; 3 and that as an
attorney, she should have the right to decline to represent clients
based upon her personal preferences. 4 As a lawyer who has litigated on behalf of women challenging gender discrimination, I now
ask a different question. Even assuming that Nathanson has the
legal right to refuse to represent Joseph Stropnicky solely because
he is male, should a feminist lawyer make that choice?
I share Nathanson's desire to devote her energy and talents to
the elimination of gender inequity. As a feminist lawyer, though, I
am concerned about the means she has chosen to redress discrimination against women. Nathanson could have chosen to represent
clients based not on their sex, but on the basis of their legal claim.
*
Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law.
A.B., 1982, Brown University; J.D., 1986, New York University. The author was lead
counsel to Shannon Faulkner and Nancy Mellette in their lawsuit which successfully
challenged the males-only admission policy of The Citadel, The Military College of
South Carolina.
1. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 1997).
2. See Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers' Identities, Client Selection and the Antidiscrimination Principle: Thoughts on the Sanctioning of Judith Nathanson, 20 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 93 (1998).

3. See Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech
Rights of Attorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 49 (1998).
4. See Gabriel J. Chin, Do You Really Want aLawyer .Who Doesn't Want You?,
20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 9 (1998).
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Instead, she chose to adopt a policy that automatically excludes
men as clients, regardless of whether their legal claim offers the opportunity to advance gender equity in the law.
Those of us who litigate gender discrimination cases participate
not only in the construction of legal doctrine, but in the construction of social norms and beliefs about gender. 5 As lawyers, the
claims that we make about sex and gender on behalf of our clients
simultaneously reveal and construct a vision of gender. In seeking
to eradicate the inequitable and discriminatory treatment of women
in family law, Nathanson relies upon and reinforces the same stereotypical beliefs about sex and gender that she purports to attack.
Her justification rests on an essentialist vision of gender which assumes, and reinforces, the legitimacy of gender as a classificatory
scheme.
Nathanson advances several related arguments to justify her
female-only divorce practice. Nathanson claims that she seeks to
devote her expertise to the elimination of gender bias in the court
system. She also claims that the issues that arise in representing
women differ from those that arise in representing men in divorce
proceedings. 6 As an example, she argues that wives' attorneys emphasize the value of homemaker services, while husbands' attorneys
do not. 7 Nathanson also argues that she needs to feel a personal
commitment to her client which she has only experienced in family
law by representing women. Moreover, she asserts that her female
clients feel more comfortable because they view her decision to represent only wives as evidence of her commitment to their interests,
and that she is more credible as an advocate because the judges
know that she only represents women. 8
Like Martha Minow, I believe that Nathanson's defense of her
female-only policy rests on an essentialized notion of gender. 9 Nathanson's refusal to represent men, even if their cases offer the opportunity to advance gender equity, depends upon, and reinforces,
5. In the Citadel litigation, for example, counsel for Faulkner and Mellette offered the courts a competing construction of men and women which challenged the
blatantly essentialist vision of South Carolina that women, because of their temperament and character, inherently were not suited for stressful, military-style education.
See, e.g., Valorie K. Vojdik, At War: Narrative Tactics in the Citadel and VMI Litigation,
19 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1996).
6. Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 40.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Martha Minow, Foreword: Of Legal Ethics, Taxis, and Doing the Right
Thing, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 5 (1998).
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the traditional construction of gender and sex as essential and natural, rather than socially constructed and contingent. Her argument
incorrectly assumes the truth of one of the most dangerous gender
stereotypes: that all women are homemakers and all men are breadwinners. Her justification assumes that all men are systematically
advantaged in marriage and all women systematically disadvantaged, in the same manner. Nathanson's claim that she can only
feel a personal commitment to female clients in family law matters,
and that her clients feel reassured because she only represents
women, appears to assume a natural and inherent affinity between
women solely on the basis of their sex, regardless of their socioeconomic status, race, religion, or age. While gender is a fundamental
construction that helps create and limit women's identity in this culture, it does not follow that all women automatically share identical
interests. There are vast differences among individual women in
their socioeconomic status and race which intersect with their gender to shape their experiences and interests. Carolyn Wexler, the
former wife of a wealthy General Electric executive whose divorce
and property fight was featured on the front page of the Wall Street
Journal, does not have the same problems and constraints as, for
example, a middle aged African-American woman with no savings
and limited job skills who is entering a job market replete with racism.10 Indeed, the differences between these two women probably
far exceed the similarities.
Litigation strategies rooted in essentialism mask the social and
cultural use of gender as a classification scheme that makes distinctions between men and women appear natural. The myth of gender
difference has been used throughout history to rationalize the exclusion of women from the public sphere and to deny them power,
opportunity, and status.
Rather than reproduce essentialist notions of gender, we
should embrace litigation strategies that challenge gender as essential and instead reveal it as socially constructed. Setting aside the
question of his motivation for asking Nathanson to represent him,
Joseph Stropnicky offered the opportunity to challenge the traditional construction of gender roles in marriage. As a husband,
Stropnicky shunned the traditional role of breadwinner and instead
10. Carolyn Wexler is a Connecticut homemaker whose divorce from her wealthy
husband, the former chief executive officer of General Electric Capital Corporation,
made front page headlines in the Wall Street Journal when a court awarded her a substantial portion of their marital estate. See Paul Bennett, "Corporate Wife" Gains in a
Divorce Ruling, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1997, at B1.
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took responsibility for homemaking and child care.1 1 As a male, he
transgresses the restrictive gender boundaries and norms of this culture. By breaking the association between his sex and gender,
Stropnicky reveals gender as a social construction rather than a natural and essential category. It is within the space created by this
disjuncture that we can begin to reconstruct sex, gender, and
identity.
My criticism of Nathanson is. not to suggest that feminist litigators must represent any man that walks in the door. There may
be circumstances which could justify a refusal to represent men
which do not depend on an essentialist rationale. For example, a
feminist lawyer might decide to handle only litigation challenging
the lack of access of women to athletic programs under Title IX.
The attorney then could refuse to represent any client, either male
or female, whose case did not involve increasing athletic opportunities for women. The crucial distinction is that the attorney would
not reject a particular male client solely because of his sex, but because of the nature of his claim. While the result will likely be the
same, the key difference is that the attorney's decision to not represent the male client does not rest on essentialist assumptions about
men and women, nor stigmatize the prospective client on the basis
of a personal characteristic. Presumably this policy would meet
MCAD approval under Stropnicky, which distinguished Nathanson's refusal to represent Stropnicky because of his status as a man
from a refusal by a lawyer to not represent a handicapped person
because the lawyer does not handle handicap discrimination claims.
There may be other situations in a gender-based legal practice
where the exclusion of male clients does not stigmatize men by virtue of their sex, but is justified as a benign compensatory measure.
As feminist litigators, we are engaged in the necessary process
of constructing gender, both inside and outside the courtroom. Our
commitment to gender equity should guide our legal practice, as
well as our legal arguments. If our goal is to promote inclusion in
this society, we should not adopt litigation strategies that embrace
exclusion without careful evaluation of their need and cost.

11.

Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 39.

